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INTRODUCTION
The nongovernmental multi-stakeholder organizations (MSOs)
responsible for administering the Internet have been guided by several
substantive engineering design principles, which we may reduce to the
following three: stability, decentralization, and user empowerment.'
These principles have ensured that the Internet is a dynamic platform for
innovation and communication.
Over the course of the past decade, however, attention among
policymakers and scholars has shifted gradually from substantive
Internet design principles to the structure of Internet governance. Now
that the Internet is one of the defining aspects of public life around the
world, Internet MSOs, including in particular the Internet Corporation
for Assigning Names and Numbers (ICANN), have been forced to
formulate new decision making processes that account for its broad
impact. At this new constitutive moment, ICANN and other
nongovernmental Internet governance institutions have had to re-justify
* Olivier Sylvain, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I
am grateful to the editors of the Colorado Technology Law Journal and Dean Phil Weiser for
the invitation to participate in the Silicon Flatirons Center's 2014 Symposium on the Digital
Broadband Migration.
1. Olivier Sylvain, Internet Governance and Democratic Legitimacy, 62 FED. COMM.
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their authority to promulgate standards and regulate Internet use in the
face of an array of stakeholders who are now making claims on
substantive policy decisions.
ICANN and other Internet MSOs now face a new skepticism (or at
least uncertainty) around the world about whether they can ever be
legitimate decision makers without incorporating governmental
participation. After all, global governance institutions in other
substantive areas privilege nation-states above almost all other
institutions. Governments generally carry the weight of legitimacy over
contested geopolitical disputes in ways that few other organizations do.
ICANN has been responsible for administering the domain name
and numbering system for the Internet addressing since the late 1990s.
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (or IANA) function, as it is
called, has long been the holy grail of global Internet governance.
ICANN has responded to increasing doubts about its legitimacy by
proposing a series of substantial reforms to its governance of the IANA
function. Indeed, rather than use the expiration of its IANA contract with
the U.S. government to insulate itself from any national governments,
ICANN has proposed to implement a governance regime that would
require more respect for national governments around the world.
These changes reflect a new era in which ICANN and other Internet
policymakers can no longer view the Internet as separate or immune
from geopolitics of the lived physical world. Like almost all other
substantive areas, today the direction that Internet policy ought to take is
hotly contested between rival nation-states-and the stakes could not be
any higher. ICANN and other Internet policymakers should accordingly
continue to reform existing Internet governance to accommodate these
realities.
II. EARLY DOMAIN NAME ADMINISTRATION
In 1998, pursuant to an agreement with the U.S. Department of
Commerce (DoC), ICANN became the administrator of the Internet's
global domain name system.2 This charge empowered ICANN to manage
and assign unique names and numbers to users' point of contact with the
network. By doing so, ICANN would ensure the reliable delivery of
communications between users around the world.
This arrangement was mostly an unsurprising incident of history.3
2. ICANN, Memorandum of Understanding Between the
U.S. Department of Commerce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(2009), https://www.icann.org/rcsourccs/unthmed-pages/ieann-mou-1 99 8-11-25-en; see also
Statement of Policy, Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741
(Dept. of Comm. June 5, 1998).
3. The Essay will not repeat the account that others have already exhaustively offered.
See, e.g., Slavka Antonova, Deconstructing an Experiment in Global Internet Governance: the
[Vol. 13.1
LEGITIMACY AND EXPERTISE IN GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE
The U.S. Department of Defense, in collaboration with top researchers at
the University of Southern California's Information Sciences Institute
and others around the country, had already developed, and was
administering a system of unique Internet identifiers. To continue to
grow, however, the Internet required the resources of a whole
administrative regime that could be staffed by full-time technologists. In
this vein, the U.S. government delegated the administration of the
domain name system to ICANN, a California-based non-profit
organization created for and devoted wholly to the task.
Specifically, through its 1998 IANA contract with the DoC, ICANN
assumed the responsibility of attending to the strict technical concerns of
administering domain names, number resources, and protocol
parameters. ICANN was to do this by pursuing a "bottom-up, consensus-
driven, multi-stakeholder" approach that reflects the genuine priorities
and interests of the whole Internet user community.4 The DoC retained a
supervisory role over the contract and would jealously hold it for the next
sixteen years.
III. DOUBTS ABOUT ICANN's LEGITIMACY TO GOVERN THE INTERNET
Many outsiders have never been at peace with this arrangement. For
nation-state critics, ICANN should never displace the important role
national governments play as the traditional representatives of their
citizens' unique political aspirations and cultural identities. The
prevailing assumption of most transnational governance regimes is that
national governments legitimately embody the authentic will of their
respective citizens in ways that few if any other organizations do or can.
It is in this vein that prominent nation-state critics of the U.S.-
ICANN arrangement have argued for greater nation-state multilateralism
in Internet governance. They point, for example, to the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), the transnational organization
responsible for moderating and promulgating transmission and
interconnection standards in telecommunications since the advent of
telegraphy 150 years ago. As an agency of the United Nations, these
ICANN critics argue, the ITU is more responsive to concerns about
governmental participation and national sovereignty, or is at least
accountable to a universally recognized (if sometimes maligned)
multinational decision making body.
Nation-states are not alone in their discontent about the current
global Internet governance regime. Many technologists, too, have argued
for major reform. They, however, are adamantly opposed to enlarging
ICANN Case, 12 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 3 (2008).




nation-state participation. Their main recommendation is that
governments, including that of the U.S., have little to no formal role in
global Internet governance. These critics argue that ICANN today is not
sufficiently independent from the political pressures of geopolitics. The
hard work of administering the purely technical concerns that enable the
Internet to operate as it does are at odds with the geopolitical questions
that characterize disputes between nation-states. The latter are
demonstrably animated by priorities that are orthogonal or just simply
opposed to the core principles in Internet governance. They accordingly
argue for ICANN's formal separation from all U.S. supervision or, more
dramatically, the creation of an altogether new entity responsible for the
IANA function but unobligated to any government.5
It is possible that transitioning the IANA function to a newly
independent ICANN or other entity would cause far more administrative
instability than it is worth.6 Consider ongoing efforts to reform ICANN
from within. In 2009, in response to prodding from ICANN leaders, the
DoC relinquished most of its formal oversight in an "Affirmation of
Commitments" (AoC). While the U.S. retained a supervisory role over
the all-important IANA function in 2009, the AoC also memorialized
promises from ICANN to abide by specified frameworks for
accountability and transparency that would ostensibly remove any
appearances of unfair government interference. In accordance with the
terms of the AoC, ICANN conducted two comprehensive reviews of its
deliberations and operations to foster accountability and transparency.
Among other things, these assessments have recommended reforms to
the administration of the ICANN Board and to some of its advisory
committees' notoriously shrouded decision making procedures.
7
IV. THE NETMUNDIAL INITIATIVE
The argument for greater governmental participation is distinct, of
5. See, e.g., Brenden Kuerbis, A Roadmap for Globalizing ]ANA, INTERNET
GOVERNANCE PROJECT (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.intcmctgovemance.org/2014/03/03/a-
roadmap-for-globalizing-iana/; see also The 2"d At-Large Summit (ATLAS 11), Final
Declaration, ICANN AT-LARGE SUMMIT II, (June 26, 2014), http://atlas.icann.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/ATLAS-ll-Dcclaration-with-appendix-RC9.pdf; see generally
ICANN AT-LARGE, http://atlarge.icann.org/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).
6. See Milton Mueller, Students School Faculty on IANA Transition: The Meissen
Proposal, INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT (Aug. 4, 2014),
http://www.intemetgovernance.org/ 2 014/08/04/studcnts-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-
mcissen-proposal/.
7. See Accountability and Transparency Review Team 2, Final Report of
Recommendations, 26-28 (Dec. 31, 2013), available at
http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/atrt2/attachments/ 20 13123 1/db2aOae7/ATRT2 FinalReport-
0001.pdf; Accountability and Transparency Review Team, Proposed Recommendations
Request for Public Comment (Oct. 20, 2010), available at http://www.icann.org/en/about/aoc-
review/atrt/proposed-recommendations- 2 0oct 1 0-cn.pdf.
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course, from the one that ICANN and others have made for greater
independence from any government participation. Critics on both sides
nevertheless have aligned in their ambition to diminish the DoC's
supervisory role. This is an opportunistic alignment of political
convenience, of course, and not about a unified principle. After all, the
two sets of critics want completely different outcomes.
To underscore the point, advocates of both sides shrewdly seized on
revelations last year about the National Security Agency's surveillance
techniques as an occasion to revisit the whole of global Internet
governance. No less than the heads of ICANN, the Internet Engineering
Taskforce (IETF, the standard-setting organization long responsible for
developing the technical Internet transmission protocol), and others
expressed "strong concern over the undermining of the trust and
confidence of Internet users globally due to recent revelations of
pervasive monitoring and surveillance" and an ambition to "accelerat[e]
the globalization of ICANN and IANA functions, towards an
environment to which all stakeholders, including all governments,
participate on an equal footing."8 The President of Brazil delivered a
stinging rebuke of the U.S.'s surveillance techniques during her speech
to the General Assembly last September.9 She appended to this criticism
concern about the U.S's. supervisory control over the IANA function.
As far as most of us know, however, ICANN's governance was
never at issue in the NSA's surveillance techniques. Intrepid news
reporting on the matter revealed that the spy agency intercepted
communications in the content and infrastructure layers of the Internet.10
It did not affect the manner by which data packets travel across the
Internet to find their destination-the responsibilities to which the IANA
function is addressed. The Snowden leaks nevertheless galvanized the
two main sets of ICANN's critics. Nation-state and technologist critics
acted on the recognition that Internet governance is as affected by
geopolitical power plays as practically all other globally significant
phenomena.
8. Montevideo Statement on the Future of Internet Cooperation, ICANN (Oct. 7, 2013),
http://www.icann.org/en/ncws/announcements/announcement-07oct I 3-en.htm.
9. Julian Borger, Brazilian president: US Surveillance a 'Breach of International Law',
GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2013, 12:27 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/201 3 /sep/ 24/brazil-president-un-speech-nsa-surveillance.
10. See, e.g., James Ball, Julian Borger & Glenn Greenwald, Revealed: How US and UK
Spy Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security, GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/20 1 3/scp/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codcs-security; Glenn
Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects 'Nearly Everything a User Does on the Internet,'
GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013), http://www.thcguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secrct-
program-online-data; Spencer Ackerman & Glenn Greenwald, How the NSA is Still Harvesting
Your Online Data, GUARDIAN (June 27, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/27/nsa-online-metadata-collcction.
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In the months following the Snowden revelations, agitation by
industry leaders, academics, civic society groups-as well as the
governments of China, Russia, Iran, and several Arab and African
nations-set in motion a remarkable convening in Sao Paolo, Brazil. In
April 2014, this convening reevaluated the legitimacy and substance of
Internet governance today. In the end, the NETmundial Initiative, as it is
called, did not cause any formal material changes to ICANN governance,
but it did articulate disaffection with the current state of affairs. The
organizers announced an "historic" "set of principles to guide the
evolution of Internet cooperation and governance" in the future. "
Many politicians in the U.S. see the NETmundial Initiative as a
serious threat to the Internet. 12 Some US politicians have openly tapped
into xenophobic fears of a Chinese takeover of networked
communications in response.' 3 Meanwhile, proponents of the status quo
see the nation-state criticism as a veiled assault on the substantive design
priorities that have guided ICANN policymaking to this point. Their
skepticism is largely informed by the repressive policies and practices of
the very countries that are most unhappy with technologies that by
design subvert centralized authority. Proponents readily point to efforts
by China and Iran, for example, to suppress the free flow of information
among their citizens. Such practices, proponents argue, are a direct threat
to the core design principles of the Internet.
U.S. administration officials did not say much in the months leading
to the April convening, expressing only an interest in listening to
criticisms and concerns.' 4 This equanimity, however, soon changed to
11. The Brazilian Model for Internet Governance Presented at NETmundial Initial
Scoping Meeting, EU BRAZIL CLOUD CONNECT (Aug. 28, 2014),
http://www.cubrazilcioudconnect.cu/content/brazilian-modet-internet-governance-prescntcd-
netmundial-initial-scoping-mceting; See generally NETmundial, NETmundial
Multistakeholder Statement (Apr. 24, 2014), http://netmundial.br/wp-
contcnt/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf; see also Milton
Mueller & Brenden Kuerbis, Roadmap for Globalizing JANA: Four Principles and a Proposal
for Reform, (Aug. 27, 2014), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract id=2408226.
12. See, e.g., Brian Fung, What House Lawmakers Still Don't Get About Control of the
Internet, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Apr. 3, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.eom/blogs/the-switch/wp/ 2014/04/03/what-house-lawmakers-still-
dont-get-about-eontrol-of-the-internet/; Brendan Sasso, House Votes to Halt Obama's Plan to
Give Up Internet Authority, NAT'L J. (May 22, 2014),
http://www.nationaljournal.eom/tech/house-votes-to-halt-obama-s-plan-to-give-up-internet-
authority-20140522.
13. See Alina Selyukh, ICANN chief Russia, China, Will Not Hijack Internet Oversight,
REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2014, 5:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/02/us-usa-internet-
domainnames-idUSBREA3 11 SE20140402.
14. David McAuley, Officials Knock Multi-Stakeholder Critics, Call NSA 'Issues" Feint
for Internet Charges, BLOOMBERG BNA ELEC. COM. & LAW REP., Nov. 7, 2013, 18 ECLR
2924 (Issue No. 44, Nov. 13, 2013).
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acceptance. In March, just before the NETmundial meeting in Sao Paola,
the DoC announced its intention to relinquish its formal supervisory role
over the IANA function by September 2015, when the IANA functions
contract expires. 15
As with their overblown concern about an imminent Chinese or
Russian takeover of the Internet, some in the U.S. see the expiration of
the DoC-ICANN relationship as nearly apocalyptic-or at least an
unnecessary capitulation of monumental proportions.' 6 This formal
transition of authority, however, does not mean that the U.S. government
would have a diminished role in governance. According to the DoC, the
decision to relinquish its oversight role is fully consistent with the U.S.
government's announcement at the time of ICANN's creation to
transition to a regime of privatized DNS administration. 17 The U.S. will
remain an active leader in Internet governance irrespective of the legal
formalism through which it has supervised ICANN's authority since the
late 1990s.
V. BRINGING GOVERNMENTS INTO INTERNET GOVERNANCE
After the DoC's announcement, ICANN almost immediately
established a formal transition process in May 2014 and, only a few
months later, solicited public comment on its plans for-specifically
those for structuring ICANN's future stewardship of the IANA function,
free from DoC oversight.'8 The notice announces that the IANA function
will transition "to the Internet community," in collaboration with the
major MSOs and other governance stakeholders. ICANN has assumed a
leadership role and has been cultivating alliances and coalitions of
stakeholders through the NETmundial Initiative. 9 ICANN also has
coupled the transition of the IANA function with efforts already under
way to enhance transparency and accountability at the organization. 20
As skeptical as proponents have been of the nation-state critique,
ICANN has also sought to honor, and even enlarge, nation-state
participation. ICANN' bylaws require the creation of a Governmental
15. See Press Release, Nat'l Telecomm. Info. Admin., NTIA Announces Intent to
Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions (Mar. 14, 2014), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/prcss-relcase/201 4 /ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-intemet-
domain-name- functions.
16. Fung, supra note 12; Sasso, supra note 12.
17. Id.
18. ICG Charter Open for Public Comments, ICANN (Aug. 8, 2014),
https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2014-08-08-en.
19. Fadi Chchadd, Transition from U.S. Government has Four Work Tracks, ICANN
BLOG (May 20, 2014), http://blog.icann.org/2014/05/transition-from-u-s-govemment-has-four-
work-tracks/.
20. See, e.g., Enhancing ICANN Accountability: Process and Next Steps, ICANN (Aug.
14, 2014), https://www.icann.org/rcsources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-08-14-en.
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Advisory Committee (GAC), which, today, is composed of over 140
governments (nation-states and others), as well as over two dozen
transnational organizations that act as GAC observers. 2' The GAC's role
is to "consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN as they
relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may
be an interaction between ICANN's policies and various laws and
international agreements or where they may affect public policy
issues." 22 The GAC meets as regularly as ICANN itself convenes, and
serves as a general sounding board for geopolitical disputes that are of
special importance to governments. However, it may not be particularly
important to the technical administration of the IANA function. Rather
than acting in a direct legislative fashion, the Committee instead may act
by presenting "to the Board directly," or by "recommending action or
new policy development or revision to existing policy. '23 The Board, in
turn, can reject the GAC's advice on any matter with a simple majority
vote of its own members2 4
ICANN's recent resolution of high-profile disputes around two
different applications for new generic top level domain names, or
gTLDs, illustrate how the GAC's advice generally works. Several non-
European registries recently applied to operate the .vin and .wine gTLDs.
Several European governments interposed a request that ICANN impose
additional safeguards for those gTLDs for fear that, without protections,
the geographic identification would be diluted or negatively affected. In
response to the requests the GAC held its own proceedings, and advised
the ICANN Board that no consensus exists, in international law or
elsewhere, on whether geographically significant names like Bordeaux or
Champagne should be given special protection during the evaluation of
26the gTLD applications. The ICANN Board (really, the ICANN Board's
New gTLD Program Committee) adopted the GAC's advice, relying also
on independent legal analysis of a French international law expert. The
Board determined that there was no international consensus on the issue,
and that it could not impose a new rule in the absence of one.27
21. See generally ICANN Bylaws, Art. XI, Sec. 2, Part 1(b), Feb. 7, 2014, available at
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws- 2 012-02-25-en#Xl.
22. Id. at Art. XI, Sec. 2, Part 1(a).
23. Id. at Art. Xl, Sec. 2, Part 1(i).
24. Id. at Art. XI, Sec. 2, Part 1(j) & (k).
25. See generally Letter from Fadi Chehadd, Pres. and CEO of ICANN, to Anna Eshoo,
H. Rep. (Aug. 11, 2014), available at
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/corrspondence/chhade-to-cshoo- 11 aug 1 4-en.pdf.
26. It also recommended that the Board seek independent research to verify the position.
See generally Annex I to Resolution 2014.06.06.NG02, ICANN, June 6, 2014, available at
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/resolutions-new-gtld-annex- I-06junI4-en.pdf.
27. Letter from Fadi Chehad6, Pres. and CEO of ICANN, to Anna Eshoo, H. Rep. (Aug.
11, 2014), supra note 25. (The European Commission, as well as France and other Western
European governments and organizations asked ICANN's Board to reconsider this preliminary
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The other TLD dispute concerns Amazon's bid for the ".amazon"
generic top level domain name.28 The GAC voted in summer 2013 to
support the strong opposition to the application of representatives from
Brazil, Peru, and Argentina. They argued that the "amazon" name,
notwithstanding the existence of the online retail behemoth's trademark,
has a long and rich history associated with the South American region.
The Committee decided not to allow the Amazon application to proceed.
After letting several months pass so that GAC and Amazon could
negotiate a settlement, the Board finally announced that the GAC advice
was entitled to a strong presumption against awarding the TLD to
Amazon. The Board relied, moreover, on outside legal analysis that
concluded that there is no international law that obligates the rejection or
29acceptance of the ".amazon" application. On these grounds, the Board
could not generate a consensus that would allow the application to
proceed.
VI. DEFINING THE ICANN BOARD'S DEFERENCE TO THE GAC
The transition of the IANA function to a fully independent
transnational body marks a defining moment in the evolution of global
Internet governance. To be sure, it is still early; the details of the
administration of the system of unique domain names and numbers after
the DoC-ICANN IANA contract expires in September 2015 remain
unclear. Various groups, including national governments and major
industry stakeholders, are still contesting the composition of the
committee responsible for the transition, 30 and the legitimacy of the
process that will produce the final plan.31 However, there is now a
growing consensus that whatever emerges next, institutional decision
making mechanisms ought to do more to accommodate nation-states in
decision making than the current approach requires. Until recently,
conclusion. They argued for stronger protections for "geographic indication" in the
administration of those gTLDs, including protection for the second level domain name (e.g.,
bordeaux.wine)).
28. Paul Sloan, Amazon.corn's Domain Power Play: We Want to Control Them All,
CNET (June 21, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-coms-domain-power-
play-we-want-to-control-them-all/.
29. Letter from Stephen D. Crocker, Chair of Bd. of Dirs. of ICANN, to Heather Dryden
(Apr. 7, 2014), https://www.icann.org/cn/system/files/correspondence/crocker-to-dryden_
07aprl 4-en.pdf.
30. See David McAuley, Three Co-Chairman for 1ANA Planning Group, But Secretariat
Details Remain Murky, 19 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 928, 928 (2014); see also David
McAuley, ICANN Bends to Community Pushback, Takes More Neutral JANA Transition Role,
19 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 779, 779 (2014).
31. See David McAuley, ICANN Should Defer to Community More in Draft JANA
Transition-Process, Groups Say, 19 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 619, 619-20 (2014); see
also David McAuley, Two Seats or Five for GAC? ICANN Asks IANA Planning Group to
Decide, 19 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 900, 900 (2014).
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existing ICANN bylaws required nearly all stakeholders and
constituencies-including nation-state governments-to be treated as
equals. The now-emerging consensus seems to be that governments have
an important claim to political legitimacy and consequently ought to
have a far more privileged role in substantive Internet policymaking than
the current state of affairs requires.
The GAC's role at ICANN is the main focus of this reform. As I
explain above, under the existing ICANN bylaws the GAC is to provide
"advice on the activities of ICANN as they relate to concerns of
governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction
between ICANN's activities or policies and laws or international
agreements." 32 This will likely remain the guiding mandate in the future.
The question, however, will be how far ICANN-really, the ICANN
Board, which is comprised of sixteen members, eight of whom are
elected and eight others who are ex officio-should go to incorporate
nation-state involvement.
Late in summer 2014, ICANN proposed for public comment a
reform of its bylaws that would "incorporate a higher voting threshold
for the Board to determine not to follow the advice of the Governmental
Advisory Committee." 33 The current rule requires the Board either to
accept the advice by a simple majority of its members or otherwise
negotiate a solution with the GAC. The new rule would require that two-
thirds of the Board's members vote to take action that is inconsistent
with GAC advice.
34
This reform refines ICANN decision-making processes to better
account for geopolitical realities that are orthogonal to the institution's
technical responsibilities under the IANA contract. The Board will likely
be unable generate a two-thirds majority on disputes that
overwhelmingly affect national policies and laws or international
treaties. To be sure, the proposal does not detail which kinds of issues on
which the Board ought to defer to GAC advice, but, as the recent
disputes involving .vin and .amazon indicate, the Board will account for
regional or national geopolitical concerns depending on the permutation
of problems that arise in each case. These will be cases for which there is
no objectively correct technological answer. However, there will be other
times when technological concerns-as compared, for example, to
stability concerns-will trump geopolitical considerations, and the Board
32. ICANN Bylaws, Art. XI, Sec. 2, Part l(a), available at
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws- 2012-02-25-en.
33. Proposed Bylaws Changes Regarding Consideration of GAC Advice, ICANN,
https://www.icann.org/public-comments/bylaws-amend-gac-advice-2014-08-15-en (last visited
Oct. 6, 2014).
34. See id. These reforms had been under consideration for well over year, even before
the NETmundial Initiative started.
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will be able to muster a two-thirds majority. In any event, those
decisions will be made by members who in the aggregate will be moved
one way or another by the advice they receive from the GAC.
The two-thirds vote threshold is not completely arbitrary. It appears
throughout the Bylaws in connection with other features of ICANN
administration, including, for example, for the removal of officers or
Board committee members. 36 More pertinently, the two-thirds vote
threshold for Board disapproval also currently exists in regards to
recommendations from the Generic Names Supporting Organization
(GNSO) to the ICANN Board. The GNSO is one of three major
"supporting organizations" within ICANN.
The GNSO's jurisdiction is gTLD policymaking and, as such, it
makes strictly technical recommendations. 37 It has generally followed the
"bottom-up, consensus-driven, multistakeholder" model that has defined
domain name governance since the late 1990s and, as such, is celebrated
among the strongest proponents of a fully independent ICANN.38
Interestingly, the two-thirds vote reform proposal for Board disapproval
of GAC advice creates a new mechanism that will force the Board's
voting members to explicitly and deliberately balance the technical
administration of the domain system against far more geopolitical
concerns that are ostensibly outside of the formal expertise of the GNSO.
VII. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF NETWORK MANAGEMENT:
COMPARING U.S. BROADBAND POLICY
The problems today in global Internet governance are challenging,
but they are not altogether unfamiliar to observers of Internet governance
and policymaking in the U.S. Here, not unlike the administration of the
system of domain names and numbers, policymakers over the past
decade and a half have had to confront questions about the authority of
federal, state, and local governments to regulate broadband network
management. At least as to federal regulation, the D.C. Circuit in its
Verizon v. FCC opinion determined for the first time that the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) has the proper authority to regulate
Internet service providers' administration of Internet transmissions to
35. See Vinton G. Ccrf, Patrick S. Ryan, & Max Senges, Internet Governance Is Our
Shred Responsibility, 10 ISJLP 1, 16 (2014).
36. See ICANN Bylaws, Art. XII, Sec. 1, available at
https://www.icann.org/resourccs/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en; see also ICANN Bylaws XIII,
Sec. 3, available at https://www.icann.org/rcsources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en.
37. See generally GSNO Council, ICANN GSNO (Aug. 18, 2014),
http://gnso.icann.org/en/about/gnso-council.htm.
38. See, e.g., Brendan Kucrbis, Solving the GAC-GNSO Participation Problem,






In the late 1990s and first half of the 2000s, the U.S. implemented a
policy of regulatory forbearance on Internet transmission generally, and
on broadband network management in particular. Federal regulators
essentially ceded the duty of regulating the manner in which backbone
network operators and local service providers transmit Internet
communications to nongovernmental standard setting organizations. In
its 2008 adjudication of a dispute about Comcast's notorious practice of
throttling users' connections, the FCC explicitly relied on the
transmission standards promulgated by IETF as authority for whether
Comcast was acting unlawfully.40 The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia overturned the FCC's order a couple years later, explaining
that the agency did not have any regulatory authority to adjudicate
disputes about network management. 4' The court rejected the claim that
existing language in the Communications Act was sufficient to give the
agency positive regulatory authority over Internet transmission practices
by local service providers.
Importantly, the D.C. Circuit never reviewed (or felt it had to
review) the substantive decision that the FCC had reached about
42
Comcast's practice of degrading subscribers' services. It focused solely
on the threshold jurisdictional question, concluding that the enforcement
action against Comcast was not "reasonably ancillary" to the
Commission's statutorily mandated responsibilities.43
By the time the D.C. Circuit published its opinion on the Comcast
adjudication, the agency already had initiated a rulemaking proceeding
on how best to preserve and promote an "Open Internet." 44 After nearly
two years of public comment and deliberation, the FCC published a
report and order that recast those principles into three rules.45 The
39. Verizon v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
40. Formal Complaint of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation
for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23
F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008), available at
https://www.publicknowlcdge.org/pdf/fp_pk-comcast complaint.pdf. (The agency also relied
to a lesser extent on broad purposive policy language in the Communications Act as well as an
Internet Policy Statement that the agency had published in 2005, even as the latter in particular
did not have the force of law.); see Sylvain, supra note 1.
41. Comcast Corp. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
42. Id. at 645 ("We begin-and end-with Comcast's jurisdictional challenge.")
43. Id. at 646-47 (The panel relied on a two-part test announced in American Libraries
that the FCC may exercise ancillary jurisdiction when the "(1) the Commission's general
jurisdictional grant under Title I of the Communications Act covers the regulated subject and
(2) the regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission's effective performance of its
statutorily mandated responsibilities.") (quoting American Library Ass'n v. Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n, 406 F.3d 689, 691-92 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
44. Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, 24 FCC Red. 13064,
13067-68, para. 10, 16 (2009).
45. See id. at para. 5 The first required service providers to be transparent about their
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Commission again relied on a variety of provisions in the amended
Communications Act to assert jurisdictional authority over network
46management practices. This time, the agency did not really rely on the
IETF standards or nongovernmental transmission norms to substantiate
the obligations it imposed on service providers. Rather, the agency
described the state of competition in the market for Internet applications
and content, service providers' incentives, and the relative costs and
benefits of intervention. The FCC attempted to do what administrative
law doctrine requires: explain the bases and purposes of their action in
order to show that it was neither arbitrary nor capricious. In doing so, the
agency conveyed a new appreciation for the fact that neither the Internet
nor its regulation is immune from the legitimating processes required
under public law.
Verizon and other service providers challenged the FCC's Open
Internet Rules in the D.C. Circuit on several jurisdictional and
substantive grounds. The panel this time struck down the rules on
substantive grounds, but not before it unequivocally determined that the
FCC had jurisdiction over service providers' network transmission
practices. 47 The Rules failed as a substantive matter because, the D.C.
Circuit explained, the Communications Act explicitly forbids the kind of
rules that the agency promulgated-that is, irrespective of whether it had
proper jurisdiction, the statute explicitly bars the FCC from imposing
common carrier regulations or anything resembling them on
"information service" providers. 48  The agency has since begun
reformulating the rules to respond to the D.C. Circuit's opinion.49
VIII. GOVERNMENTS, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, AND LEGITIMACY
The broadband network management litigation illustrates that the
public law that governs the Internet has evolved in the United States as
the technology has matured. Forbearance may have been appropriate
during the decade or so after its first commercialization in the early
network management practices. The second forbade fixed-as opposed to mobile-broadband
service providers from blocking content, applications, services, and devices. The third forbade
fixed service providers from unreasonably discriminating against lawful network traffic. The
agency promulgated a more flexible rule for mobile broadband service providers, forbidding
them only from blocking websites or competitors' voice applications. See also id., para. 109
(mobile providers are not barred from unreasonably discriminating against network traffic.)
46. Id. at para. 5 n. I (discussing 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 254, and 1302(a)).
47. Verizon v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 740 F.3d 623, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("the
Commission has offered a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made")
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983)).
48. 47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (2010)
49. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 37448-01 (2014).
COLO. TECH. L.J[
1990s, but that regulatory approach is no longer appropriate.50 That is,
Internet transmission practices are now subject to the same public
lawmaking processes to which other important industries are. To be sure,
policyrnakers may disagree about what policy ought to require of service
providers, but there is little question now that policymaking in this area
has entered a new phase. Today, policymakers must abide by the formal
public lawmaking processes already in place in order to retain
legitimacy.
In this new period, we can no longer defer to technological expertise
alone. At a minimum, we no longer assume that Internet policy may be
promulgated by nongovernmental bodies in the first instance. Most other
industries are subject to scrutiny by governments because of their relative
impact on public life. The same should be true for the Internet and all
networked communications today, over twenty years since its
commercialization.
This observation lends itself quite easily to discussions about
nation-state participation in global Internet governance and ICANN
independence from governmental oversight generally. The recent effort
by the ICANN Board to enlarge GAC participation in Internet policy
governance underscores its recognition that governmental participation is
important to its ongoing legitimacy, and portends good things for the
ongoing legitimacy of whatever governance regime emerges in the
coming years.
50. Cf. Sylvain, supra notc I.
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